deference rule in 1969 with the concept that some ecclesiastical property disputes may be decided with neutral principles of law, i.e. principles that do not embroil the court in substantive religious determinations. 4 Courts vary in the manner in which these tests are applied, however, resulting in some cases in an erosion of the First Amendment protections that these tests offer to religious organizations. This article will explore this phenomenon in Pennsylvania state courts, focusing specifically on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Connor v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia. 5 In Connor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dictated an element-by-element application of the "neutral principles" analysis prior to and instead of the application of the deference rule, which effectively subverts the use of the deference rule and thereby undermines the First Amendment inquiry necessary to guard the freedom of religious organizations.
6
In this article, I contend that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Connor failed to distinguish between the functions of the neutral-principles analysis and the deference rule. That is, Connor's interpretation of the appropriate use of neutralprinciples analysis asks only whether a controversy may be addressed by a court without excessive entanglement in religious dogma or doctrine. This understanding of the appropriate inquiry omits any consideration of the religious organization's right to religious freedom-the Connor test asks if a court can decide the issue and does not ask whether a court should decide it. This disregard for the rights of religious organizations flies in the face of longstanding Supreme Court precedent of firmly upholding the First Amendment religion clauses, most recently reaffirmed by the Court in its January 2012 decision in In examining this complex issue, Section I of this article supplies background information regarding the origin and application of the deference rule and the religious belief and worship in many most impressive forms," while the United States espoused the "full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principles . . . ." Id.
neutral-principles analysis. Section II analyzes the Connor Court's formulation of the deference and neutral-principles analyses. Section III focuses on Pennsylvania lower courts' subsequent application of Connor's precedent. Section IV discusses the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor and how its approach to the First Amendment religion clauses demonstrates that the Connor Court's test lacks an important constitutional inquiry necessary to safeguard the freedom of religious organizations. Ultimately, the Hosanna-Tabor decision demonstrates the U.S. Supreme Court's dedication to upholding the purpose of ensuring religious freedom to religious organizations that underlies the First Amendment religion clauses. In addition, a comparison between Connor and Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates how Connor's element-by-element application of the neutral-principles analysis prior to any deference considerations effectively omits this constitutional inquiry, severely curtailing the constitutional rights of religious organizations in Pennsylvania.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: THE DEFERENCE RULE AND NEUTRAL-PRINCIPLES ANALYSIS

A. The Deference Rule
In 1872, the United States Supreme Court first articulated the right of religious organizations to control certain aspects of their internal affairs-the foundation for the deference rule Watson involved a property dispute between pro-slavery and anti-slavery factions of the Presbyterian Church after the end of the Civil War. 10 Each faction claimed that the election of its opposing faction's elders was invalid, that its own faction should be recognized as the valid local church, and that it was therefore the rightful owner of the local church building. 12 Id. at 734-35. In Watson, the appellants in the case before the Supreme Court had admittedly separated from the national Presbyterian Church, set up an opposing church, denied the authority of the national Presbyterian Church, and refused to abide by its judgments. By their actions, the appellants first laid the foundation for what would become the constitutional inquiry known as the deference rule.
13
The first formulation of this doctrine specified that whenever the highest applicable church tribunal has decided "questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law," civil courts must accept these decisions as final and binding.
14 The Watson Court articulated three distinct rationales behind its rule.
It argued that civil court intrusion into these areas violates the rights of religious organizations to practice their religion by subverting the authority of the religious tribunals established to resolve such religious issues. 15 The Watson Court understood this self-determinative aspect of religious institutions to be a fundamental aspect of religious freedom. 16 In addition, the Court emphasized the voluntary nature of joining oneself to a religious body and the implied consent to be bound by the government of such bodies once joined. 17 Lastly, the Court argued that civil courts lack the competency to address the intricacies of ecclesiastical law and religious faith, and should thus defer to the "more learned tribunal."
18
While the Watson Court analysis had an arguably constitutional ring, it was in 1952 that the Supreme Court explicitly tied the deference rule to the First Amendment in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral. 19 The Court struck down a have effectively declared that they are not the faction in line with the national Presbyterian Church, and therefore have no arguable right to the church property. Id.
13 Id. at 726-34.
14 Id. at 727.
15 Id. at 729. 16 Id. This concept of a religious decision-making body being free from civil law determinations arguably stems from the theological concept in place at the time of the Founders and authors of the First Amendment that religion, far from being a set of rituals or customs, was the expression of duty that each individual owes her creator. This duty and the laws that accompanied it were considered to exist at a more fundamental level than civil law. between the sixth-and seventh-grade boys, Eric got into a shoving match with one of the sixth-grade boys, and the two groups subsequently arranged a "rumble" for the next day. 36 Eric allegedly told a classmate that he intended to bring in something that would not do any damage but that would make a good bluff. 37 The following day, school administration called Eric to the principal's office and discovered in Eric's possession a kit containing a two-inch nail file, scissors, and a letter opener. 38 Eric was subsequently expelled for bringing a "weapon" to school, and the school administration circulated a letter stating that a student brought a "penknife" to school and had been expelled. 39 The also made defamatory post-expulsion oral remarks to individual parents that implied that Eric posed a threat to the school and community.
40
The Connors contended that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should be able to resolve the issues involved in their tort case because the question of whether the school made false statements about Eric were issues that could be resolved by applying neutral principles of tort law.
41
Without first conducting a deference rule inquiry, the Court decided that a neutral-principles analysis was proper, 42 since the Connors did not challenge the expulsion decision but instead sought damages for communications that the School allegedly made subsequent to Eric's expulsion. 43 The Court determined that it was "reasonably likely that the trial court will ultimately be able to consider whether the parties carried their respective burdens as to each element of appellants' defamation claims without intruding into the 'sacred precincts.'" 44
B. The Connor Court Reverses the Application of the NeutralPrinciples Analysis and the Deference Rule
When the Connor Court articulated the neutral-principles analysis in its opinion, it actually described a new interpretation of the analysis that placed it before the deference-rule determination. The Court stated that [T] he fact-finding court must: (1) examine the elements of each of the plaintiff's claims; (2) identify any defenses forwarded by the defendant; and (3) determine whether it is reasonably likely that, at trial, the fact-finder would ultimately be able to consider whether the parties carried their respective burdens as to every element of each of the plaintiff's claims without "intruding into the sacred precincts," Beaver-Butler, 489 A.2d at 1321.
45
40 Id. at 1087-88. The Connors alleged that the items found with Eric did not constitute "weapons," and that the letters and oral communications therefore involved untrue and harmful statements about their son. Id. 41 Id. at 1097-98. 42 The breadth of the neutral principles analysis-whether it is a proper inquiry in tort claims-was at issue in Connor and remains a legitimate issue in Pennsylvania. This issue, however, is not addressed in the scope of this article. 43 Connor, 975 A.2d at 1101. 44 Id. at 1113. 45 Id. at 1103.
The Court called for a "claim-by-claim, element-by-element approach," 46 noting that, only if it seemed likely that the parties could not carry their burdens without offering impermissible religious evidence, should the deference rule be applied.
47
Applying this new interpretation of the neutral-principles analysis, the Connor Court listed the seven elements of defamation, noting that the only contested element in the defamation claim was the defamatory nature of the post-expulsion communications, that is, whether any of the items that Eric brought to school could fairly be described as a "weapon" and a "pen-knife."
48 Ultimately, the Court held that the question of whether the Eric's items could be classified as weapons was "a secular finding of fact well within the ken of a fact-finding civil court," and, therefore, that those neutral principles of law could be applied to determine whether the post-expulsion communications were defamatory.
49
C. The Effect of the New Application of the Neutral-Principles Analysis on the Deference Rule
While praising the wisdom of and purporting to uphold the deference rule in its opinion, the Connor Court's articulation of its new neutral-principles analysis weakened and ultimately usurped the role of the deference rule. The deference rule and the neutral-principles analysis coexisted in the past, and the function of the neutral-principles analysis had always been to serve as a method to resolve church property disputes that a court had already determined (using the deference rule) did not involve religious doctrine or discipline, etc. 50 The deference rule (i.e. the constitutional inquiry) was always the first step in the decision of whether a court should engage in a neutral-principles analysis. 51 The neutral-principles analysis was merely one way of resolving those few cases that were not "severely circumscribe The neutral-principles approach appears to assume that the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if civil courts are forbidden to consider certain types of evidence. The First Amendment's Religion Clauses, however, are meant to protect churches and their members from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from having to decide difficult evidentiary questions . . . . The neutral-principles approach consists instead of a rule of evidence that ensures in some cases the courts will impose a form of government and a doctrinal resolution at odds with that reached by the church's own authority.
Id. at 612 n.2. 61 In a minister's breach of contract case, the superior court upheld the ex-minister's right on remand to provide non-religious proof for each of the elements of his claims as part of their neutral-principles analysis.
62
Reverend Mundie appealed from an order sustaining Christ United Church of Christ's preliminary objection and dismissing Appellant's breach of contract complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 63 The superior court reversed and decided that the court could resolve the underlying issues in the religious matter.
64
In Mundie, the Consistory of the Christ United Church of Christ decided to terminate the pastor's employment four months early and not grant his retirement. 60 See id. This causes some confusion in Salem (see infra). It seems that the court has considered the issue and wants to grant deference to the decision of the church body regarding its minister. Showing such deference would be in line with Watson and the Free Exercise clause. However, the court applied Connor and seemingly recognized that Connor reversed the order of inquiry. Because of this reversal, the Salem Court cannot grant deference yet, but must remand the case for a neutral principles analysis. 61 Id.
62 Id. at 802. This result is especially surprising in the context of the ministerial exception, a doctrine which usually provides greater protection to religious entities than the deference rule. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
63 Id. at 795. 64 Id.
65 Id. at 797. contract laws, Mundie filed claims of breach of contract and bad faith against the church.
66 The trial court granted the church's preliminary objection, agreeing that the trial court could not resolve the contract issue because the dispute was ecclesial in nature. 67 Mundie appealed, claiming that the "underlying dispute (breach of contract) does not turn on religious doctrine or polity but seeks the enforcement of a secular right through civil contract law."
68
To decide whether the trial court could resolve the issues present in this case, the superior court conducted a neutral-principles analysis. 69 The court explained that the church had the right to "hire, fire, promote, and assign duties to its ministers as it sees fit, not because the churches are exempt from all employment regulations (for they are not) but rather because judicial review of those particular employment actions could interfere with rights guaranteed by the First In effect, because of Connor's new approach to determining which religious issues may be resolved by Pennsylvania courts, the superior court's inquiry asked merely if the elements of the claim could be proven by non-religious means, rather than asking whether deference should be given to this religious organization's decision regarding its pastor because of the religious organization's First Amendment rights.
B. Salem United Church of Christ v. Darcy
The Connor decision's reversal of the order in applying deference and neutral principles also led to an unusual result in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.
73
While the court knew that deference would normally be required in the case of a church's decision regarding its own minister, 74 the court was unwilling to grant deference prematurely, and instead remanded the case for an element-by-element neutral-principles analysis consistent with the Connor opinion.
75
The Salem United Church of Christ appealed from the order of the Court of Common Pleas denying and dismissing its complaint and petition for preliminary injunction. 76 The 79 Id. at 1. Even after she was removed as pastor, Darcy continued to enter upon the premises of Salem, purporting to still be the minister. The congregation sought an injunction barring her from the church building, since she refused to respect their decision. Id. at 2-3.
organization's First Amendment rights, while Salem answered that its complaint was a simple trespass action.
80
The Commonwealth Court agreed with Salem. 81 While acknowledging with
Beaver-Butler the deference that courts must generally give the decisions of religious organizations in the resolution of internal religious matters, the court was reluctant to grant such deference prematurely. 82 Citing Connor, the court held that
an "in depth analysis of the substance of the claims set forth in a complaint" was necessary before a preliminary injunction could be granted. 83 The court explained that
The trial court's dismissal of Salem's complaint and petition for injunction immediately after the settlement conference and prior to a hearing . . . was error. Darcy had not even formally raised any defenses to Salem's complaint and petition for injunction and clearly the trial court did not conduct an analysis of the complaint on a claim by claim basis. As our Supreme Court has noted, all disputes among members of a congregation are not doctrinal disputes; deference is not mandated simply because there exists a judicature in the church. See Connor; Beaver-Butler. Therefore, this matter must be remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Connor.
84
Again, in order to follow Connor, the trial court must turn the constitutional inquiry on its head. The court must first determine that no neutral principles of law with which the issue can be resolved exist before it can grant deference.
IV. LESSONS FROM HOSANNA-TABOR: APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
Since the adoption of the First Amendment religion clauses, courts have had extreme difficulty in their attempts to articulate and apply workable analyses that uphold both the religious liberty of a religious organization and the rights granted to individuals in secular society. 85 Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99 (1989 . Proponents of this understanding of civil courts' interaction with church disputes have noted a distinctive likeness between the courts' treatment of religious jurisdictional issues and the political question doctrine. See Goldstein, supra, at 499. See also Gedicks, supra, at 132; Idleman, supra note 8, at 220. While such a comparison on the surface seems apt, its functionality as a usable standard is questionable. Goldstein, supra, at 501. Like the neutral principles analysis, the "religious question" solution approaches the constitutional concerns from the wrong angle. See Idleman, supra note 8, at 252-55, 259-67. The proper application of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is not analogous to a separation of powers issue; nor does it compare to the court's determination that this question would best be left to the jurisdiction of another party. See id. The Free Exercise Clause is not couched in such discretionary terms; rather, its purpose is the protection of religion and the convenience of "manageable standards" should have no bearing on whether religion will be protected. See id. Christian role models who integrate faith into all subjects." 90 Perich enjoyed the opportunity to "bring God into every subject taught in the classroom."
91
Hosanna-Tabor's kindergarten-through-eighth-grade school employs two categories of teachers: "contract" teachers and "called" teachers.
92 Hosanna- 
B. The Ministerial Exception and Its Connection with the Deference Rule
The ministerial exception arises out of the deference-rule tradition and is in fact the application of the deference rule in a specific circumstance-the selection by a religious organization of its leaders or "ministers. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court was seemingly faced with the choice to either allow a religious organization the latitude and flexibility to disobey antidiscrimination laws at will, or to infringe upon this religious organization's constitutionally guaranteed First Amendment rights. 121 The ministerial exception, which was designed to protect the rights of religious organizations, could be a vehicle by which religious individuals' anti-discrimination rights are ignored by the courts. However, when looking back upon the long line of cases establishing and developing the court's attitude toward religions and their leaders, it seems that the function of the ministerial exception, in effect, is to ensure that whoever is in a position of authority, education, or representation is chosen by that religious organization, using their own doctrinally acceptable criteria.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, reversing the Sixth Circuit, and upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hosanna-Tabor. 122 The Chief Justice, beginning with a discussion of the Magna Carta and continuing to the adoption of the First Amendment, outlined the history of the struggle for freedom from government interference with religion, a struggle which formed the background of the adoption of the First Amendment. 123 Based on this history and the intent of the First Amendment religion clauses as illustrated by the writings and actions of the founding fathers, the Court upheld the ministerial exception. 124 In strong support of the First Amendment freedoms afforded religious organizations, the Court stated that
[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
125
Further, the Court emphasized that "government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself" is a distinct area requiring protection under the First Amendment religion clauses. Given the U.S. Supreme Court's long history and recent reaffirmation of the importance of allowing religious organizations the freedom to shape its mission and doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's narrowing of these freedoms seems to conflict with the profound amount of respect and deference with which the United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted these clauses.
In addition to interpreting the First Amendment religion clauses broadly, the Court also-as is illustrated in Hosanna-Tabor-utilizes a purpose-driven interpretation of these clauses. That is, the Court re-articulates the background and purpose behind the adoption of the First Amendment religion clauses, and seeks to uphold this purpose through its ruling. The Court, in essence, considers the effect of its ruling on the freedoms of the religious organizations in question, rather than employing mechanical tests or more narrow inquiries.
It is precisely this inquiry into the effect of a judicial determination of a certain issue on a religious organization's First Amendment rights that the deference rule is meant to address.
127 However, it is this very effect, or purpose, inquiry that is lacking in Connor and its progeny. When the neutral-principles analysis occurs prior to, and instead of, the application of the deference rule, the question of what effect such a decision will have on a religious organization remains unasked. The neutral-principles analysis merely establishes whether a court has sufficient non-doctrinal evidence with which it can decide a certain issue, and fails to ask the deference-rule question of whether the court can decide the issue, considering the religious organization's First Amendment rights. The deference rule and the neutral-principles analysis arose as separate and complementary inquiries. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Connor turns this relationship on its head by reversing the inquiry. 133 The Connor analysis begins with its newly defined element-by-element neutral-principles inquiry. 134 If each element-separately considered-can be decided with neutral principles of law, the inquiry ends and the deference rule is never applied.
135
Such a skewed relationship between these tests results in the omission of the constitutional inquiry into the effect that the court's resolution of a certain issue would have on the First Amendment rights of the religious organization. In essence, this new neutral-principles scheme asks whether a court is able to resolve a certain issue, not whether it is constitutionally permissible for a court to do so.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor sheds light on an appropriate approach to determining which issues affecting religious organizations may be resolved by the court without infringing upon the organization's First Amendment rights. 136 The key lies in a careful consideration of the overall effect that any decision may have on a religious organization's determination of its members, leaders, tenets, or doctrine. The Hosanna-Tabor court upholds the deference rule in the specific form of the ministerial exception. 
